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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this paper is to study the profitability and solvency implications of the proposed 
Basel III capital and liquidity requirements in the global banking context. The intent is to improve 
our understanding on how the Basel III capital and liquidity requirements impact upon the 
functioning of global systematically important banks (GSIBs), and how this knowledge could 
prove to be useful in answering questions of policy relevance like financial stability in economics. 
A longer-term perspective is taken in order to link capital and liquidity requirements with the 
notion of “systemic risk” within the evolution of the international financial and monetary system.  
Of special interest is the interaction between macroeconomic policy - including monetary, 
exchange rate and combined micro-macro-prudential policy within the setting of present-day 
Basel III regulatory and supervisory reforms.  More specifically, the paper addresses two related 
issues: first, it studies and presents several financial indicators that GSIBs disclose; second, it 
examines how these same indicators could be related to GSIBs’ profitability and solvency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he objective of this paper is to study the profitability and solvency implications of the proposed 
Basel III capital and liquidity requirements in the global banking context. The intent is to improve 
our understanding on how the Basel III capital and liquidity requirements impact upon the 
functioning of global systematically important banks (GSIBs), and how this knowledge could prove to be useful in 
answering questions of policy relevance like financial stability in economics. A longer-term perspective is taken in 
order to link capital and liquidity requirements with the notion of “systemic risk” within the evolution of the 
international financial and monetary system. More specifically, the paper addresses two related issues: first, it 
studies and presents several financial indicators that GSIBs disclose; second, it examines how these same indicators 
could be related to GSIBs’ profitability and solvency. 
 
Following this introductory section, the paper is structured as follows: the conceptual background to the 
study is presented in the second section. Third, the research methods used in this study are described. In the fourth 
section, the empirical results of the analysis are presented and analysed. In the final section, the preliminary 
conclusions of the study are drawn; also, the limits of the study are discussed, and areas of further study are 
suggested. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
In two recent speeches, Caruena (2012) and Mahapatra (2012) both examined the possible conflict in 
banking between shareholder value and «Basel’s» vision of financial stability and safe banking. Caruena (2011) also 
discussed the Basel III reform and the new challenges it posed for supervisors, risk managers and auditors. Cechetti 
(2011), Tarullo (2011) and finally Ingves (2011) explained how the proposed international agenda for financial 
regulation would contribute to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system. Macklem (2012) illustrates 
T 
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in Figure 1 how the Financial Stability Board (FSB) will coordinate the financial-reform policy cycle within G-20 
countries. 
 
Figure 1:  FSB Coordination of the Financial-Reform Policy Cycle 
 
Gauthier (2011) notes that the new bank capital and liquidity requirements proposed in Basel III should 
contribute to reduce the frequency of financial crises. In particular, higher standards of liquidity would help banks 
become more resilient in periods of financial stress. The importance of global liquidity and its international 
repercussions have been recently reiterated by Carney (2011). His views draw heavily on the recently published 
report on global liquidity prepared by a group of the Committee on the Global Financial System (2011). Recently, 
Caruana explained how to build a more resilient financial system. His thoughts are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  The Basel III Reform Programme-Implementation 
 
Mersch (2011) explained why he believes that Basel III will provide regulators in Luxembourg and 
elsewhere with standard empirical measures of liquidity risk: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) providing them with a tool kit that can help to mitigate funding and market liquidity 
risk. He reports that while a slight negative effect on output is not disputed, the adoption by banks of higher liquidity 
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requirements like the NSFR leads to an approximate reduction in output volatility by 1%. Overall this suggests that 
prudent liquidity controls would have a beneficial effect on the real economy. In a recent analysis, of a global 
liquidity event, Debelle (2011) explained how the action by the ECB, together with the Fed through the provision of 
the US dollar swap facility, should alleviate some of the funding tensions for European banks. In effect, provided 
that they have appropriate collateral, European banks should be able to meet their liquidity needs in the period ahead 
in euros, and in US dollars. The author observed that Australian banks are not seeing the same sort of stresses as are 
present for some of the European banks. 
 
In light of the possibility of unwanted and unforeseen fluctuations in global liquidity and their international 
repercussions, and also the fact that the BCBS (4 November 2011) has only recently issued its final rules for 
systematically important banks, it now seems appropriate to re-examine the adequacy of the proposed Basel III 
liquidity requirements. The G-SIBs report provides an assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency 
requirement. The additional loss absorbency requirements will range from 1% to 2.5% of Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) depending on a bank’s systemic importance with an empty bucket of 3.5% CET1 as a measure to discourage 
banks from becoming even more systematically important. 
 
Given the above analysis and the growing importance of financial risk management by GSIBs in particular 
and by banks in general, it appears that a possible managerial response would be to consider the net benefits of  
meeting, or even exceeding, the proposed Basel liquidity and capital requirements. Notice here that the present 
standards are under review by the BCBS (2010). The point being made here is that adopting more stringent  
“private” liquidity  and capital requirements, especially for designated G-SIBs, would lessen the recourse to central 
bank “official” liquidity and the need to provide “official” capital  . As the CGFS (2011) global liquidity report 
states: “Policy responses, in the form of official liquidity, to global liquidity call for a consistent framework that 
considers all phases of global liquidity cycles, countering both surges and shortages. Measures to prevent 
unsustainable booms in private liquidity like liquidity requirements are linked with micro- and macro prudential 
policies as well as the financial reform agenda.” 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This section presents several financial indicators that GSIBs disclose. The purpose is to examine how these 
same indicators could be related to GSIBs’ profitability and solvency given recent fluctuations in global economic 
activity and in global liquidity and their international repercussions. The proposed analysis benefits from the fact 
that the BCBS (4 November 2011) has issued its final rules for twenty-nine (29) global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs). This allows an examination of the proposed Basel III capital and liquidity 
requirements using the FSB-BCBS-29-G-SIBs-sample which is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  The FSB-BCBS G-SIBs Sample Composition 
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By using each bank’s 2011 annual report or its latest available 2011 quarterly report, it was possible to 
obtain the following financial information: 
 
 Market capitalization of shareholders’ equity (B US $)  
 Total assets (B US $) 
 Short-term credit ratings from Moody’s (M) and Standard & Poor’s (S & P) 
 Long-term credit ratings from Moody’s (M) and Standard & Poor’s (S & P) for subordinated debt 
 Tier I Common Equity Ratio (CER) as defined by the BCBS capital adequacy requirements (%) 
 Liquidity measures: various ratios and metrics will be presented and explained in the text 
 ROE (%) defined as latest 12-month figure ($) of net income available to common shareholders’ divided by 
average shareholders’ equity ($) during the same period 
 
4. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
The results of the study are structured and analysed in three parts. First, Table 3 presents the market 
capitalization and total assets of each bank included in the G-SIBs sample. Second, both their short-term and long-
term credit ratings are included in Table 4. Thirdly, each bank’s Tier 1 CER, liquidity measures or metrics, and ROE 
figures are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 3 
G-SIBs’ Size Metrics (B US $) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By examining the figures reported in Table 3 on banks’ market capitalization and total assets, it is possible 
to ascertain that a bank’s size in itself was important for it to be designated a “G-SIB” by the FSB-BCBS. For 
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instance, the market capitalization figures which average $53.8 B US range from a low of $6.7 B US 
(Commerzbank) to a high of $155 US B (HSBC Holdings). In addition, the total assets figures which average 
$1,604 B US range from a low of $216 B US (State Street) to a high of $2,813 B US (Deutsche Bank). Also notice 
in Table 3 that two relatively small US banks were nevertheless designated as being G-SIBs: Bank of New York 
Mellon and State Street. This is due to the fact that both banks play a global systematically important role in asset 
administration and management. 
 
For all G-SIBs, both the short and long term debt credit ratings issued by Moody’s (M) and Standard & 
Poor’s (S & P) are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  G-SIBs’ Debt Credit Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By examining G-SIBs’ short term credit ratings, it is possible to see that they do not vary very much from 
one bank to another. In addition, for any given G-SIB, both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s short term credit rating 
levels are comparable. The sample mean short term rating was P-1.11 (M) and A-1.17 (S & P); notice that for both 
M/S & P, a figure of 1.00 represents the highest possible rating. As of December 31
st
 2011, Bank of America had the 
lowest short term credit ratings; that is P-2 / A-2 issued respectfully by M/S & P. Nordea was issued the highest 
ratings in the sample at P-1 / A-1
+
. It is also possible to observe in Table 4 that the level of longer term subordinated 
debt credit ratings varied more than short term credit ratings within the G-SIB sample. The sample median for 
longer term credit ratings was A1 / A respectfully for M/S & P. Bank of America was issued the lowest long term 
ratings at Baa2 / BBB+ respectfully from M/S & P. As for short term credit ratings, Nordea also was issued the 
highest long term credit ratings by M/S & P; that is, Aa2 / AA- respectfully from M/S & P. 
 
The figures which present the G-SIBs’ regulatory capital, liquidity and ROE metrics are shown in Table 5. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2013 Volume 29, Number 1 
162 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  © 2013 The Clute Institute 
Table 5:  G-SIBs’ Capital, Liquidity and ROE Metrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be observed in Table 5, all G-SIBs reported in their 2011 annual report at least one measure of Tier 
1 Capital Equity Ratio (CER). Most banks (13) reported only the older Basel II version of Tier 1 CER. Many 
European banks (10) reported the newer Basel 2.5 June 2012 target of Tier 1 CER. Finally, only (7) G-SIBs reported 
on achieving Basel III 2013-2019 gradual targets of Tier 1 CER. As a crude measure of G-SIBs regulatory capital 
adequacy, the sample average Tier 1 CER was computed using the lowest Tier 1 CER (Basel II, Basel 2.5 or Basel 
III) figure reported by each bank. Using this computing method, the sample average Tier 1 CER reached a value of 
10.41%. 
 
Table 5 also reports on the liquidity measures or metrics reported by G-SIBs in their 2011 annual report. It 
can be observed in Table 5 that seven banks in the G-SIBs sample did not disclose any liquidity measure or metric. 
Of the remaining banks, thirteen used the Deposits to Liabilities Ratio (DLR) to illustrate their level of liquidity. 
Another subset of thirteen banks disclosed a variety of heterogeneous measures of liquidity. Just to illustrate and in 
order of presentation: excess liquidity is denoted EXL, excess liquidity at the central bank (EXLCB), liquidity 
balance (LB), available government reserves (AGR), liquidity reserves (LR), government guarantee (GG). Only five 
banks in the sample reported using the proposed Basel III short term liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) or the longer 
term net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Of these, four banks reported their proposed LCR measures; four reported 
their proposed NSFR measures; only three banks reported both their proposed Basel III, LCR and NSFR measures. 
 
The annual ROE ratio was used in Table 5 to study the profitability of each bank composing the G-SIBs 
sample. By observing the ROE metrics, it can be observed that individual bank profitability varied from a loss of -
67.4% (Dexia) to a gain of 19.15% (Bank of China) during 2011. For all banks, the ROE metric averaged 6.83%. In 
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the complete G-SIB sample, fifteen banks earned a ROE of less than 8% per year; six banks had a ROE between 8 to 
10%, and only eight banks earned a ROE above 10%. 
 
It is generally believed that the G-SIBs’ capital, liquidity and ROE metrics shown in Table 5 can also be 
used by regulators to measure financial strength, and the level of liquidity and solvency risk. Because they are 
relatively inexpensive and readily available, analysts, investors and bank financial managers often use these same 
Tier 1 CER, liquidity and ROE metrics to track and evaluate a bank’s overall financial performance. For example, 
Ackermann (2012), as shown in Figure 2 in the text, makes use of his bank’s Tier 1 CER, liquidity and ROE metrics 
in order to illustrate how Deutsche Bank strives to balance these key performance indicators over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  In Search of Balance 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this paper was to study the profitability and solvency implications of the proposed Basel 
III capital and liquidity requirements in the global banking context.  The intent was to improve our understanding on 
how Basel III capital and liquidity requirements impact upon the functioning of global systematically important 
banks (GSIBs), and how this knowledge could prove to be useful in answering questions of policy relevance like 
financial stability in economics.  More specifically, the paper addressed two related issues: first, it studied and 
presented several financial indicators that GSIBs disclosure; second, it examined how these same indicators could be 
related to GSIBs’ profitability and solvency. 
 
The results presented in this paper indicate that banks that were designated as GSIBs generally shared a set 
of common characteristics like having relatively important levels of total assets and market capitalization.  GSIBs 
were also found to have been issued relatively high short term credit ratings; however, the level of long term credit 
ratings differed much more between GSIBs.  The analysis also revealed that the study of GSIBs’ regulatory capital 
and liquidity adequacy was complicated by the fact that the capital and liquidity metrics disclosed by many GSIBs 
were often incomplete and heterogeneous.  Thus, it became difficult to evaluate if the proposed Basel III capital 
(from 2013 to 2019) and liquidity requirements (from 2015 to 2018) will be met or exceeded during their respective 
phase-in timetable.  The results also indicate that GSIBs’ profitability was found to be generally low in 2011 since 
ROE averaged only 6.83%.  In fact, only 10 banks (or 15) out of the 29 GISBs sample generated a satisfactory ROE 
profitability ratio in 2011; that is, higher than +/- 10% (or +/- 8%).  The preliminary results presented in the study 
seem to indicate that the size characteristics, the credit ratings and the capital, liquidity and profitability metrics 
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selected here could also be used by regulators to rapidly evaluate a GSIB’s financial strength, and its level of 
exposure to liquidity and solvency risks.  As recently illustrated by Yang and Tsatsoronis (2012), using a GSIB’s 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (MVE/BVE) could also be informative.  Finally, because they 
are relatively inexpensive to gather and readily available, financial analysts or investors, as well as bank financial 
managers, often use the same or comparable metrics as those suggested here to track, evaluate and benchmark a 
bank’s overall financial performance. 
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